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Executive Summary
This report advances recommendations to improve interactions between public officials and
members of the public on social media platforms. Social media is one of the primary ways that
public officials communicate with their constituents and other members of the public. From the
White House and Congress to small town mayors’ offices and town councils, social media has
been almost universally adopted. Social media does not just provide public officials far reaching
platforms to spread their chosen messages. It also opens forums for exchanges with members
of the public. Most officials’ social media pages allow users to post messages. Users can voice
their opinions on the public officials’ work and engage in discussions with other users and,
sometimes, the public officials. When public officials block and delete users’ comments on
social media, they are often infringing on those users’ First Amendment rights and harming
dialogue on issues of public importance.
Public officials’ blocking of users has led to lawsuits at the federal, state, and local levels. Two of
the more prominent suits were brought against President Donald Trump and New York
Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez for blocking users on Twitter. The suit involving
Trump’s Twitter account reached the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which ruled
that Trump violated Twitter users’ First Amendment rights when he blocked them from seeing
and commenting on his tweets. In Knight Institute v. Trump, the court held that the interactive
space beneath tweets on Trump’s “@realDonaldTrump” account constituted a designated
public forum where the First Amendment protects a wide range of speech. A designated public
forum is a place set aside by the government for expressive activities where the government
needs compelling reasons to prevent speech. The forum beneath Trump’s tweets was
government-created, the court reasoned, because Trump was using the account for official
purposes, such as making announcements about actions he was taking as president. Because
parts of Trump’s account were a public forum, it was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination
for him to block users based on the opinions they expressed.
We recommend that Congress pass legislation drawing on the Second Circuit’s reasoning in
Knight Institute. The legislation should ban public officials who are using social media for official
purposes from blocking any users or deleting any user comments from their social media
accounts.
A “public official” should include all federal elected officials and all officials appointed by the
president to serve as officers of the United States, except for judges. This designation would
include members of Congress, the president, the vice president, Cabinet secretaries, and some
other high-ranking executive branch officials. We recommend several factors to determine
whether an account is used for official purposes: (1) whether the account includes an explicit
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disclaimer that it is as an official government account; (2) whether the account includes a
description of the official’s government office; (3) whether the account includes one or more
links to official government websites; or (4) whether the account is used for posting content in
furtherance of an official’s government duties, such as publishing press releases, advocating for
legislation, or sharing information about hearings, town halls, or state visits.
The statute we are recommending should include exceptions. For example, public officials
should be allowed to delete content that is not protected by the First Amendment and use the
muting and hiding functions to manage the content that they see.
Although our proposed legislation would only regulate federal officials, states should pass
similar laws to cover state legislators, governors, and state executive branch officials. Public
officials’ uses of social media is a nationwide issue impacting members of both political parties
and officials at every level of government. A uniform rule applying to all public officials is the
most equitable and efficient way to protect the First Amendment rights of social media users
and ensure an open dialogue on social media about matters of public importance.

2
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Introduction
Social media has become one of the most important platforms for communication and dialogue
between public officials and members of the public. Even when social media is not used for
direct interaction between officials and members of the public, it provides a place for members
of the public to interact with each other and learn about officials’ work and opinions on matters
of public interest. However, officials sometimes block members of the public from their social
media pages, which prevents those users from sending them messages, posting comments on
their pages, and even seeing their posts. When public officials block users from the social media
pages that they use for official business due to objections to users’ opinions, the blocked social
media users’ First Amendment rights are violated. Specifically, users are denied their rights of
free speech and assembly and their right to petition the government.1
The political discourse on social media platforms between public officials and social media users
must be improved. Our report provides a solution, through a statutory framework, that can be
implemented at the federal and state levels to help solve this issue. This report begins with a
discussion of the prevalence of social media use among public officials and the legal doctrines
governing their ability to block social media users and delete their posts. Next, the report
provides an overview of social media regulations—from inside government and social media
companies—that apply to public officials. The final Part of the report describes our
recommendation for a federal law, which states should replicate, that prevents public official
using social media accounts for official purposes from blocking other users and deleting posts.

I. Background: Social Media as a New Public Forum
To better understand the intersection between social media and the First Amendment, this Part
provides an overview of public officials’ uses of social media and relevant First Amendment
doctrines.

Public Officials’ Widespread Use of Social Media Platforms
Social media has become an essential way for public officials to communicate with the public.
Compared with traditional media, such as mail and television, social media makes it easy and
convenient for public officials to disseminate information to the public. Over the past several
years, the importance of social media platforms has been illustrated through their adoption by

1

See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 233 (2d Cir.
2019); infra Part I.B.
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most public officials.2 Nearly all members of the Senate and House of Representatives use social
media platforms to communicate with the public. All Senators use Facebook and Twitter.
Among members of the House, 98.8 percent use Facebook and 99.8 percent use Twitter.3 The
widespread use of social media does engender some problems, including raising questions
about whether public officials violate users’ First Amendment right by blocking them and
deleting their comments.

The Public Forum Doctrine
Whether social media users have First Amendment protections when interacting with public
officials on social media is partially dependent on whether the officials’ social media pages are
public forums. A public forum is a forum set aside by the government for expressive activities
where, according to the Supreme Court, the government must “demonstrate compelling
reasons for restricting access to a single class of speakers, a single viewpoint, or a single
subject.”4 Courts have reached different conclusions on whether a public official’s social media
account is a public forum. As discussed in more detail below, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that the “interactive space” associated with President Donald Trump’s
Twitter account where users can respond to and discuss his tweets constituted a public forum.5
But there have been cases in other jurisdictions where a public official’s social media account
was not considered a public forum. In Morgan v. Bevin, a federal trial court ruled that the
Kentucky governor’s Facebook account was not a public forum, and, therefore, the plaintiffs’
First Amendment rights were not violated when they were blocked from access and posting on
the page.6 The court ruled that the governor’s social media accounts are privately owned
methods of communication. Furthermore, the court stated, “Governor Bevin’s Twitter and
Facebook accounts are a means for communicating his own speech, not the speech of his
constituents.”7
Courts have also reached varying conclusions at the local level. In German v. Eudaly, a political
activist brought a First Amendment claim against a Portland City Commissioner for blocking her
from a non-official Facebook page. The commissioner had used the Facebook page to respond
to criticism from the activist. But the federal trial court held that the commissioner was entitled
to block the activist because the page was not a public forum.8 In Davison v. Randall, a resident

2

JACOB R. STRAUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45337, SOCIAL MEDIA ADOPTION BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS: TRENDS AND
CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 6 (2018), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45337.
3
Id.; see also Congress on Social Media Reports, QUORUM (2019), https://quorummedia.s3.amazonaws.com/media/blog/2019-12-16T144239.909055_CSMR19_FinalV3.pdf.
4
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983).
5
Knight Institute, 928 F.3d at 234-36 (2d Cir. 2019).
6
298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010-12 (E.D. Ky. 2018).
7
Id.
8
German v. Eudaly, 2018 WL 3212020, at *1, *6 (D. Or. June 29, 2018).
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of Loudon County, Virginia, sued the chair of the County Board of Supervisors, alleging that the
chair violated his First Amendment and Due Process rights by blocking him from the chair’s
social media page.9 The court held that the page was a public forum because it explicitly
encouraged citizens to use it to comment on matters of public interest.10
Courts that have analyzed whether public officials’ social media pages are public forums have
not been guided by a clear and uniform standard. The lack of a single standard raises the
possibility that social media users in different jurisdictions will receive inconsistent First
Amendment protections. Legislation, such as the statute we propose, could ensure that all
public officials are held to the same rules.

Viewpoint Discrimination
If part of a public official’s social media account is a public forum or the public official is acting
in his or her official capacity when using the account, the public official engages in
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination if he or she blocks a user or deletes a user’s
comments based on the user’s opinions.11 The Supreme Court defined viewpoint discrimination
as “discrimination because of a speaker’s specific motivating ideology, opinion, or
perspective.”12
Social media users have sued various government officials for viewpoint discrimination. The
court in the lawsuit against the Loudon County supervisor discussed above concluded that the
supervisor engaged in viewpoint discrimination by blocking a constituent on Facebook for
accusing other officials of corruption.13 In Leuthy v. LePage, two Maine residents sued the
governor for viewpoint discrimination. They objected to having their critical comments deleted
from the governor’s Facebook page and being blocked from the page.14 In another suit, a
Connecticut citizen sued a police chief and a detective for blocking him from the police
department’s Facebook page after he made numerous posts that criticized the department.15 In
Missouri, a constituent sued a state representative for blocking him on Twitter after he
retweeted someone else’s criticism of her.16 And, in Windom v. Harshbarger, a West Virginia

9

912 F.3d 666, 685 (4th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 682.
11
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 236 (2019) (citing Manhattan
Community Access Corp. et al. v. Halleck et al., 139 S.Ct. 1921 (2019)); Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia
Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
12
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 819-20 (1995).
13
See Davison, 912 F.3d at 687-88.
14
See 2018 WL 4134628 (D. Me. Aug. 29, 2018).
15
See Dingwell v. Cossette, 327 F. Supp. 3d 462, 466-67 (D. Conn. 2018).
16
See Campbell v. Reisch, 367 F. Supp. 3d 987, 990 (W.D. Mo. 2019).
10
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resident alleged viewpoint discrimination in response to being blocked on Facebook by a state
legislator whose proposed legislation the resident had criticized.17
These cases illustrate that viewpoint discrimination is a widespread, national issue. That there
are a variety of public officials who have faced lawsuits, such as governors, police officials, a
chair of a county board of supervisors, and members of state legislatures, shows that this is not
just an issue that affects only the most prominent public officials.

Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump
The Second Circuit’s ruling Knight Institute v. Trump is the seminal case on the intersection of
First Amendment rights and public officials’ social media use. In Knight Institute, several Twitter
users sued President Trump after they were blocked from his Twitter page.18 The court
considered whether the public forum doctrine could apply to certain parts of the account,
specifically: the content of the tweets, the timeline of the tweets, the comment threads
initiated by the tweets, and the interactive space associated with each tweet where other users
reply, retweet, or like the tweet.19 The blocked users sought to engage in political speech, which
is protected under the First Amendment.20
The court concluded that part of Trump’s Twitter account was a public forum. For a space to be
a public forum, it must be owned or controlled by the government.21 Trump argued that his
Twitter account was not a public forum because the plaintiffs could not establish that the
account was government property and because he did not take steps to make it an official
account to host the speech of other Twitter users.22 The court held that although Twitter is a
private company, the president controls various aspects of his Twitter account, including the
content of the tweets, who can access his timeline, and who can participate in the interactive
space below his original tweets.23 Despite the fact that @realDonaldTrump was the president’s
personal account before his presidency, the court nonetheless declared it a public forum
because “there was substantial and pervasive government involvement with and control over
the account . . . and [the president] consistently used the account as an important tool of
governance and executive outreach.”24

17

See 396 F. Supp. 3d 675, 678-79 (N.D.W. Va. 2019).
Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 2019).
19
Id.
20
Id. at 238. Note that both parties to this lawsuit stipulated that the plaintiffs did not engage in unprotected
speech. See id. at 234.
21
Id. at 234-35.
22
Id. at 231.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 235.
18
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After the court reached its public forum finding, it determined that Trump engaged in viewpoint
discrimination. Viewpoint discrimination is always presumed impermissible when directed
against speech constitutionally protected in a public forum.25 In a certain category of public
forums, government regulations of speech are allowed if they are narrowly drawn to achieve a
compelling state interest.26 In Knight Institute, however, the court found that this exception did
not exist.27 Therefore, the continued exclusion of the plaintiffs was impermissible viewpoint
discrimination under the First Amendment. And although Trump argued that the blocking did
not burden anyone’s speech because of available “workarounds,” such as googling the
president’s tweets, the court still held that his actions were unconstitutional.28 In its holding,
the court cautioned that “if the First Amendment means anything, it means that the best
response to disfavored speech on matters of public concern is more speech, not less.”29

II. Current Regulatory Measures: More Is Needed
It is vital to protect social media users from unconstitutional restraints on their right to interact
with public officials and other users on social media platforms. Congress should pass a law
preventing public officials from blocking social media users from accounts that the officials use
for government business. Federal legislation is the most efficient approach because it
eliminates jurisdictional differences that might result from courts setting different precedents
on the issue. This uniformity would provide clarity and make enforcement simpler. Some might
criticize this proposal as part of a tendency toward over-regulation in the United States’ legal
system,30 but our recommended legislation would protect a crucial constitutional right while
ameliorating the burden on the courts to resolve disputes over social media users’ First
Amendment rights.
As this Part illustrates, legislation is preferrable to regulating social media companies and
relying on existing social media policies at the federal, state, and local levels.

25

Id. at 239-40.
Id. at 239.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 239.
29
Id. at 240.
30
See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Why the Rule of Law Suffers When We Have Too Many Laws, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2017,
10:25 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/10/01/why-the-rule-of-lawsuffers-when-we-have-too-many-laws/; see also Grudges and Kludges: Too Much Federal Regulation Has Piled Up
in America, ECONOMIST (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2017/03/02/too-much-federalregulation-has-piled-up-in-america.
26
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Regulation of Social Media Companies Is the Wrong Approach
Regulation of social media platforms is not an ideal method to tackle the challenges
surrounding online public discourse because regulation could harm social media companies’
First Amendment rights and because social media platforms self-regulate through terms of
service and content moderation.31
The level of First Amendment protection afforded to social media companies varies based on
different conceptions of their role in society. When social media sites are treated as state
actors, they are fully subject to constitutional restrictions on free speech prohibitions.32
Similarly, if social media companies are viewed as special service providers, such as cable
providers, their platforms are essentially designated public forums, meaning courts might only
approve of content-neutral regulation of users’ speech.33 But if social media platforms are
treated as private news media companies that make editorial decisions to moderate or remove
content, the broadest First Amendment protections from government regulation apply.34
However, when a social media platform grows too big, the Communications Act of 1934, which
requires broadcast media to operate in the “public interest, convenience and necessity,”35
might limit the companies’ discretion.36 The Supreme Court has indicated that social media

31

Public officials are generally subject to terms of service as a condition of using social media platforms for official
and personal purposes. Modified terms of services between social media companies and certain government
entities also exist. See The Twitter Rules, TWITTER: HELP CENTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-andpolicies/twitter-rules (last visited Sept. 8, 2019); see also Terms of Service, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
32
Treating private entities as state actors in First Amendment jurisprudence is predicated on “the company town
theory.” See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (holding that a privately owned “company town,” like a
government, could not restrict First Amendment rights.). The Marsh Court noted that when balancing “the
Constitutional rights of property owners against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion . . . the
latter occupy a preferred position.” This approach is sweepingly broad and may be the most restrictive for social
media companies. Some federal courts have resisted treating social media companies as company towns. For
example, in a lawsuit against YouTube and Google for content censoring, a federal district court noted that social
media companies should not be treated as company towns simply because they can carry out functions
traditionally performed by the government. “While many functions have been traditionally performed by
governments, very few have been ‘exclusively reserved to the State.’” Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 2018 WL
1471939, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) (quoting Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978)).
33
See VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45650, FREE SPEECH AND THE REGULATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT 3032 (Mar. 27, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45650.pdf; see also Alissa Ardito, Social Media, Administrative
Agencies, and the First Amendment, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 301, 304 (2013) (arguing that the public forum doctrine is the
proper way to address First Amendment application to social media sites).
34
See id. at 37-38 (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)).
35
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2018).
36
Under the public interest standard, federal-licensed broadcasters in the 1920s, who were able to access and
even monopolize precious radio airwaves, were considered “trustees of the public’s airwaves” and therefore were
required to use the broadcast medium in the public’s interest, including responding to the needs of local
communities. MEDIA BUREAU, FCC, THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING 1, 10 (Aug. 2019),
https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/public-and-broadcasting.pdf.
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sites resemble private news media, and thus enjoy the fullest First Amendment protections.37
Therefore, regulation of social media to improve interactions between users and public officials
might run afoul of the First Amendment.
Furthermore, social media companies already engage in self-regulation of their platforms,
although it is imperfect.38 Twitter takes steps to limit the dissemination of posts by public
officials that might violate Twitter’s user rules.39 When Twitter believes it is against the public
interest to remove such a post, such when a world leader wrote it, the company adds a notice
to the post explaining its decision and adjusts its algorithm to prevent the post from being
widely seen.40 Although this policy does not directly address the problems posed by public
officials blocking users, it is an example of Twitter attempting to balance increasingly extreme
political rhetoric with the need for open dialogue on social media about matters of public
importance.41
Facebook is establishing a board to provide independent oversight over content deletion
decisions.42 The board will also give policy advice, such as by providing input on who the
company should define as a politician.43 Additionally, Facebook also has a feature that allows
users to filter out profanity in their pages’ comments sections,44 which government accounts
can employ. Above all, social media sites’ terms of service agreements contractually bind their

37

See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019) (holding that “merely hosting speech
by others is not a traditional, exclusive public function and does not alone transform private entities into state
actors subject to First Amendment constraints”).
38
See, e.g., Derek du Preez, “The Age of Inadequate Self Regulation Must Come to an End”—MPs Publish Facebook
Fake News Report, DIGINOMICA (Feb. 17, 2019), https://diginomica.com/the-age-of-inadequate-self-regulationmust-come-to-an-end-mps-publish-facebook-fake-news-report.
39
Twitter Safety, Defining Public Interest on Twitter, TWITTER: BLOG (Jun. 27, 2019),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/publicinterest.html.
40
See id. Twitter used this approach with some of President Trump’s tweets following the 2020 presidential
election. Kate Conger, Twitter Has Labeled 38% of Trump’s Tweets Since Tuesday, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/05/technology/donald-trump-twitter.html.
41
For a general discussion on increasingly partisan tweeting and Twitter’s algorithm frequently displaying extreme
content from both sides of the political spectrum, see Oliver Darcy, How Twitter's Algorithm Is Amplifying Extreme
Political Rhetoric, CNN (Mar. 22, 2019, 7:42 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/22/tech/twitter-algorithmpolitical-rhetoric/index.html.
42
See FACEBOOK, OVERSIGHT BOARD CHARTER 4-5 (Sept. 2019),
https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2019/09/oversight_board_charter.pdf. The board will likely consist of
11 to 40 members, with two to three co-chairs. The board will serve appellate review functions, including
reviewing content removal decisions: “In instances where people disagree with the outcome of Facebook’s
decision and have exhausted appeals, a request for review can be submitted to the board by either the original
poster of the content or a person who previously submitted the content to Facebook for review.” Id.
43
Id. at 2, 7.
44
See Moderate Your Facebook Page, FACEBOOK FOR MEDIA (Dec. 7, 2015),
https://www.facebook.com/facebookmedia/blog/moderating-your-facebook-page.
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users and allow the companies to take action when inappropriate content appears on their
sites.45

Existing Policies, Laws, and Proposals: Why They Are Insufficient
Existing federal-level policies regarding public officials’ uses of social media are insufficient and
inconsistent. The policies vary across the agencies and branches of government. The White
House does not have a published social media policy that the public can view. Congress’s
policies define key terms inadequately and do not guarantee effective enforcement measures.
The types and the extent of restrictions, if any, differ widely with the officials’ positions.46
Additionally, it does not appear to be common practice to regulate public officials’ use of
personal social media accounts that are used partially for official business.
The Senate rules only generally prescribe that a senator’s use of a third-party website must
include the senator’s title and must display an identifying statement that the account or profile
is the “official account of” the senator.47 For the House, a short rule requires that “[m]embers …
ensure their social media URLs and account names reflect their position.”48 Neither chambers’
rules clearly address lawmakers’ personal use of social media accounts, even though the line
between personal and official uses is at the crux of many disputes over public officials’ uses of
social media. Compared to Congress, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has given much more
attention to streamlining its employees’ use of social media. An extensive DOJ memorandum
provides detailed guidance on social media use, including use for personal purposes.49

45

See Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/tos (last visited June 11, 2020) (“You may use the Services
only if you agree to form a binding contract with Twitter and are not a person barred from receiving services under
the laws of the applicable jurisdiction.”).
46
For purposes of this report, “public officials” are individuals elected or appointed to a government office.
47
Internet Services and Technology Resources Usage Rules, UNITED STATES SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/usage/internetpolicy.htm.
48
STAFF OF COMM. ON HOUSE ADMIN., MEMBERS’ CONGRESSIONAL HANDBOOK 31 (2019),
https://cha.house.gov/sites/democrats.cha.house.gov/files/documents/116th%20Members%27%20Congresional
%20Handbook_0.pdf.
49
The DOJ’s attention to streamlining its employees’ use of social media is demonstrated by the rules’
identification of six specific issues potentially relevant to any official social media activity. First, due to the sensitive
and confidential nature of the department’s work, employees are required to protect confidential information
while using social media. Second, employees are generally restricted from commenting on social media about a
pending trial or releasing information that may “reasonably be expected to influence the outcome of” a case.
Third, DOJ employees are prohibited from engaging in discrimination or harassment on social media. Fourth, the
employees are not allowed to post online anonymously. Fifth, employees are not allowed to comment online
about judges. Sixth, employees are to closely monitor their uses of departmental property, such as official
computers and official time. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States, to All
Department Employees (Mar. 24, 2014).
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1. Issues with Official Versus Personal Uses of Social Media
Official and personal uses of social media are often difficult to distinguish. In addition to using
accounts that are clearly identified as official accounts, members of Congress often use their
personal accounts to publish posts or interact with the general public about their work as
legislators. This amounts to using the accounts for official activity, triggering First Amendment
protections for users who interact with those accounts.50 Popular personal accounts, such as
the unofficial “@AOC” account for Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, can be more
conversation-driving than lawmakers’ official accounts.51 When a Congress member’s social
media account includes his or her official title, it makes it more likely that a court would
conclude that it is an official page constituting a First Amendment-protected public forum. But
it does not end the inquiry; courts will probably look to the content of posts to determine an
account’s nature.
Some federal social media policies attempt to define official use but may lack sufficient detail.
The Senate’s rules define “official business” as “activities and duties that directly or indirectly
pertain to the legislative process or to any congressional representative functions generally.”52
Examples of official activities in the Senate rules are the “conveying of information to the
public, and the requesting and collection of the views of the public . . . or the views and
information of other governmental entities.”53 The Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”)
states that employees using social media for personal purposes “must not engage as if
presenting the official position of OPM.”54 The Department of Interior (“DOI”) states that social
media accounts are created as “professional personas . . . for official business and maintained
using government resources . . . [and] are the property of the federal government.”55 Personal
uses of social media accounts can “blur the line between professional and personal lives and
interactions.”56 Therefore, the DOI mandates that “care must be taken to ensure that personal
use of social media does not create the appearance of official use of social media.”57 The DOJ’s
social media memorandum contains the same “blurred line” language.58

50

See infra Part III.D.3.
Representative Ocasio-Cortez’s personal Twitter account has over ten million followers and she is active on the
account multiple times every day. See Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@AOC), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/aoc. Her
official account, however, has approximately 430,000 followers, and she does not post on that account on a daily
basis. See Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@RepAOC), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/repaoc.
52
Internet Services and Technology Resources Usage Rules, supra note 47.
53
Id.
54
OPM, SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY 15 (Jul. 2017), https://www.opm.gov/news/social-media-presence/social-mediapolicy.pdf.
55
OFFICE OF COMMC’N, DOI, 470 DM 2, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL 2 (May 21, 2019).
56
Id. at 4.
57
Id.
58
Cole, supra note 49, at 3 (“The line between public and private, personal and professional, is often blurred,
especially when an employee using social media includes his or her Department affiliation or title, or comments on
51
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The Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) regulation of its employees’ uses of personal social
media is far reaching, and, therefore, potentially more effective. The rules provide that
standards of conduct applicable to FDA employees in their official capacities may also apply to
uses in their personal capacities.59 Certain ethical restrictions apply to personal use, including
regarding receipt of compensation, disclosure of nonpublic information, and improper use of a
government title.60 To help prevent confusion on personal accounts, the rules recommend
using a disclaimer, such as “the views and information presented here are mine.”61
2. State and Local Policies
State and local governments have also created policies for government officials’ and
employees’ uses of social media. For example, the City Council of Minneapolis established rules
restricting social media use for official businesses to only authorized accounts that are
registered with the city.62 The City of South San Francisco’s Social Media Policy has a very
specific “comment policy” as to what can and cannot be deleted in the comments section.63
New York regulates official use of social media by requiring its officials to use social media sites
in compliance with applicable laws and the social media platforms’ terms of service
agreements, and subject to a content review and approval process.64 New York’s rules do not
regulate personal use, although the rules encourage employees to use disclaimer language
indicating that their personal posts do not represent the views of the state.65

matters related to his or her work, or the work of the Department . . . Two types of social media commenting merit
special attention and should cause Department employees to exercise extreme care: comments that can be
perceived as showing prejudice based on race, gender, sexual orientation, or any other protected basis; and
comments on the work of the Department, including cases and investigations.”).
59
FDA, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY 4 (Nov. 2015),
https://www.fda.gov/media/94313/download.
60
Id. at 5.
61
Id.
62
These rules apply to public officials and city employees, covering over 4,200 people. See Andy Mannix,
Minneapolis Approves New Social Media Restrictions for Elected Public Officials, Employees, STAR TRIBUNE (Jul. 25,
2019, 9:08 PM), http://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-approves-new-social-media-restrictions-for-electedofficials-employees/513198342/.
63
See CITY OF SOUTH SAN FRANCISCO, SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY, https://www.ssf.net/departments/citymanager/communications/connect-with-us/social-media-policy (last visited June 12, 2020).
64
OFFICE OF INFO. TECH. SERVS., N.Y. STATE, No. NYS-P11-001, IT POLICY: SOCIAL MEDIA (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://its.ny.gov/sites/default/files/documents/nys-p11-001_social_media_0.pdf.
65
Id.
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III. Recommendations
Existing case law, social media companies’ rules, and government social media policies are
inadequate to address this nationwide First Amendment issue that impacts members of both
political parties. Congress should pass a law, which state legislatures should replicate in their
jurisdictions, that bridges the gap between existing solutions and necessary protections for all
social media users. A statutory solution would ensure that all social media users enjoy
consistent and efficient protection of their First Amendment rights in their engagement with
public officials’ social media accounts. The legislation would reduce the need to seek recourse
through expensive and time-consuming litigation.
Proposed Rule
If a person is a “public official” and that person is using a social media account for “official
use,” then he or she shall not block any user or delete any user comments from their social
media account.
This Part focuses on elaborating on our proposed framework. First, it discusses why our
proposal should be implemented primarily through a federal law. Second, this Part navigates
the challenges of determining the characteristics of a public official and what type of social
media activity constitutes official use. Third, this Part discusses the meaning of “any user” who
public officials cannot block and whose comments public officials cannot delete. Finally, this
Part provides an overview of the exceptions to this framework as well as the proposed
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.

Implementing Regulation of Public Officials on Social Media
Restrictions on government employees’ speech have withstood constitutional scrutiny.66 The
above framework could be used as a rule of a legislative chamber, state legislation, or federal
legislation. Each approach has benefits and drawbacks. As a rule of a chamber of Congress or
other legislative body, implementation and monitoring might be simpler because the legislative
body implementing the rule would be responsible for its enforcement. However, a legislative
rule would not be legally binding, and it would only apply to legislators. Legislators are not the
only public officials with whom social media users have a right to engage.

66

See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that “when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline”).
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As a state law, the framework would be binding on all state officials,67 significantly more
officials than a legislative chamber rule. Additionally, states might be better positioned to
enforce the framework than the federal government because state government officials are not
as numerous or geographically dispersed as federal government employees. However, the state
legislation approach could result in variation among different states. Uniformity is important for
this type of law because social media has a national and global reach, and all social media users,
not just public officials’ constituents, need access to their pages.
Federal legislation is the best approach for implementing the framework because it would be
legally binding and uniform across the country. It would regulate federal public officials, who
have the most constituents and largest social media presences in most circumstances.
Additionally, federal legislation would serve as a template for legislation at the state level to
regulate state officials while accounting for circumstances that are unique to individual states.
Federal legislation does have its drawbacks. Members of Congress will probably hesitate to
impose legally binding regulations on themselves and there are definitional and enforcement
issues, which are discussed below. Still, federal legislation with supplementary state laws is the
most effective approach for implementing our proposed regulation of public officials on social
media.

Who Is A “Public Official”?
The definition of a “public official” is not clearly provided in case law in this area. In the various
lawsuits addressing public officials blocking constituents on social media platforms, a
president,68 a congresswoman,69 a chair of a county board of supervisors,70 and a governor71
have all been deemed public officials for the purposes of the relevant suit. These examples help
shape our definition, but they do not constitute a comprehensive list of the position that make
someone a public official. This Part explores various existing definitions of a public official from
the perspectives of the government and social media platforms.

67

The First Amendment has been incorporated to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See generally Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating the freedom of speech clause);
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (incorporating the freedom of the press clause); De Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (incorporating the freedom of assembly clause and the freedom to petition the
government for a redress of grievances clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating the
free exercise of religion clause); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating the establishment clause).
68
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019).
69
See Hikind v. Ocasio-Cortez, 2019 WL 2994693 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2019).
70
See Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2017).
71
Leuthy v. LePage, 2018 WL 4134628 (D. Me. Aug. 29, 2018).
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1. Government Perspective: Internal Revenue Service Definition
In the context of income taxes, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) defines a public official as
“any individual who . . . is an employee of the government for whom he or she serves.”72 The
IRS’s definition is extremely broad and is meant to encompass any person who is on a federal,
state, or local government payroll. This definition would regulate thousands of people whose
social media platforms likely would not constitute a public forum. Overregulating social media
use would create an unconstitutional burden on some government employees. The definition
of a public official must be narrower for the purposes of our proposed legislation.
2. Social Media Perspective: Twitter’s Verified Badge and World Leaders
Twitter provides two relevant definitions pertaining to who could qualify as a public official.
First, Twitter uses a blue “verified” checkmark to validate high-profile users’ accounts. The blue
verified badge is intended to let people know that an account of public interest is authentic.73
Some examples of accounts of public interest include users who are involved in “music, acting,
fashion, government, politics, religion, journalism, media, sports, business, and other key
interest areas.”74 Because this verified badge is used so broadly and covers many people who
do not work in government or hold public office, it should not be dispositive in determining
whether a user is a public official for the purposes of our proposed legislation.
Second, Twitter has created a definition for people of public interest to whom the normal
Twitter Rules do not apply.75 For an exception to the Twitter Rules to apply, the account owner
must: (1) “[b]e or represent a government/elected official, be running for public office, or be
considered for a government position;” (2) “[h]ave more than 100,000 followers;” and (3) “[b]e
verified.”76 This definition is too narrow for the purposes of this legislation. Requiring a certain
number of followers in the definition of a public official would allow many public officials to
evade any regulation and could incentivize public officials to stop gaining followers on their
accounts. Under-regulation would defeat the purpose of guaranteeing constituents access to
public officials at all levels of government, especially the state level.

72

IRS, CLASSIFICATION OF ELECTED AND APPOINTED OFFICIALS,
https://www.in.gov/sboa/files/Hoff_3_Classification_of_Elected_and_Appointed_Officials.pdf.
73
About Verified Accounts, TWITTER: HELP CENTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/managing-your-account/abouttwitter-verified-accounts (last visited June 15, 2020).
74
Id.
75
See Twitter Safety, Defining Public Interest on Twitter, TWITTER: BLOG (June 29, 2019),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/publicinterest.html; Twitter Inc., World Leaders on Twitter:
Principles & Approach, TWITTER: BLOG (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2019/worldleaders2019.html.
76
Id.
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3. Constituent-Based Definition
Another possible definition of a public official is any person elected to office who has
constituents. This creates a bright-line rule for any level of government and any branch of
government. Having constituents implies a duty to engage in a discourse with them, which is
the type of communication our proposal seeks to facilitate and protect. However, this definition
could also be under-inclusive. For example, Cabinet secretaries and other public officials in the
federal government’s executive branch would fall outside the scope of a solely constituentbased definition.
4. Recommended Definition: Elected and Appointed Approach
We recommend defining “public official” as: “Anyone who is currently elected by the public, or
appointed by the president as a principal officer of the United States, excluding judges.” This
definition is meant to encompass current employees in the federal government and does not
apply to public officials after they leave office. In a version of the law adapted for the statelevel, the definition would simply change from anyone appointed by the president to anyone
appointed by the governor.
Judges are explicitly excluded from the definition, even though they are appointed. Judges are
not expected to interact with the public in the same way as political figures. They communicate
with the public primarily through written opinions and statements from the bench.
Additionally, judges have their own rules of conduct and ethics that cover their interactions
with the public.77 However, state law versions of this proposed federal legislation could take
into account the fact that some states elect their judges.78

77

See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (2010) (stating “[a] judge shall conduct the judge’s personal and
extrajudicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with the obligations of judicial office”).
78
Judicial Selection: Significant Figures, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (May 8, 2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/judicial-selection-significant-figures (stating that 39
states use elections to select their judges at some level of their state judiciary).
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Public Officials Under Our Proposed Legislation
Legislative Branch

Executive Branch

•

•
•
•
•

•

All Members of the House of
Representatives
All Senators

President
Vice President
Ambassadors79
All statutorily-designated Cabinet
members80 and any official the president
designates as a Cabinet-level official.

What Constitutes “Official Use”?
Currently, courts have considered the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a
public official is using a social media platform in his or her official capacity. Although indicia can
be helpful on a case-by-case basis, the purpose of imposing a regulation is to create a uniform
standard that can be consistently and efficiently applied. The driving question behind the
definition of official use is whether an average constituent perceives a social media account to
be an extension of a public official’s office. This Part explores the indicia that courts have used
to determine official use as well as the Federal Tort Claims Act’s (“FTCA”) definition of scope of
employment for guidance. Finally, this Part proposes a list of factors that will automatically
constitute official use under our proposed legislation.
1. Judicial Interpretation of Official Use
Courts have used a variety of factors to establish “official use” in cases where public officials’
blocking of users or deletion of user comments were challenged.81 They look to the “public
presentation of the [a]ccount” to see if it “bear[s] all the trappings of an official state-run
account.”82 An explicit disclaimer of official use is often an important factor in a court’s analysis.

79

The Constitution’s Appointments Clause gives the president the power to “appoint ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other [principal] officers of the United States.” U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2. According to the Supreme Court, principal officers are essentially limited to Cabinet members,
federal judges, and ambassadors. See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
80
5 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (listing the 15 executive departments whose leaders make up the president’s Cabinet: the
Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of
the Interior, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Labor, Department of Health
and Human Services, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Transportation, Department
of Energy, Department of Education, Department of Veterans Affairs, and Department of Homeland Security).
81
See supra Part I.B-C.
82
Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 2019).
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For instance, in Knight Institute, the Second Circuit was partially persuaded by the plaintiff’s
argument that Trump’s Twitter account stated that it belonged to the “45th President of the
United States of America, Washington D.C.”83 Listing a government website (“.gov”) or linking
to a government page on a social media account is also a strong indicator of official use.84 The
way that a public official’s staff refers to the social media account is also instructive.85
Some public officials may explicitly describe the purposes of their pages, such as soliciting
comments and conversation from the general public about governmental matters. For example,
the Chair of a County Board of Supervisors whose account was the subject of a lawsuit stated
that her Facebook page was open to “ANY Loundoun citizen” to post comments “on ANY issues,
request, criticism, complement or just your thoughts.”86
Courts also look to the type of content public officials post. Making formal policy
announcements is a strong indicator of official use. The Second Circuit focused on the fact that
Trump had used his Twitter account to announce that he fired Chief of Staff Reince Priebus and
replaced him with General John Kelly.87 Trump had also used his Twitter account to share
information about his discussions with South Korea’s president about North Korea’s nuclear
program.88 Additionally, publishing press releases, advocating for legislation, sharing
information about hearings, town halls, or state visits indicate use in one’s official capacity.89
2. FTCA Interpretation of Official Use
Statutory definitions provide further guidance on what constitutes official use. The FTCA
provides that federal employees can face lawsuits for tortious actions performed “within the
scope of [their] office or employment.”90 The statute and interpreting case law define the scope
of employment by considering “whether the employer hired the employee to perform the act
in question and whether the employee undertook the allegedly tortious activity to promote the
employer’s interests.”91 Translating this framework to the public official context, official use
could be an action that a public official was elected to perform in the normal course of business

83

Id.
See Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 683 (4th Cir. 2019); Leuthy v. LePage, 2018 WL 4134628, at *4 (D. Me. Aug.
29, 2018).
85
Leuthy, 2018 WL 4134628, at *4.
86
Davison, 912 F.3d at 682. Cf. Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1011 (E.D. Ky. 2018) (holding that the
governor of Kentucky’s Facebook page was not a designated public forum where the page stated that its purpose
was to “communicate [the governor’s] vision, policies, and activities to constituents and receive feedback from
them on specific topics that he chooses to address in his posts.” (emphasis added)).
87
Knight, 928 F.3d at 232.
88
Id.
89
See Leuthy, 2018 WL 4134628, at *4; see also Windom v. Harshbarger, 2019 WL 2397809, at *1 (N.D.W. Va. Jun
6, 2019).
90
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2013).
91
KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45732, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT (FTCA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW 12 (2019).
84
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or an action that could benefit the government institution for which he or she works. This
definition would likely include promoting policies, interacting with constituents and soliciting
their concerns, and disseminating government-related information. Although there could be
disagreement about what exactly public officials are hired to do, the FTCA guidelines are helpful
in framing the scope of official use.
3. Recommended Definition: Official Use
Our recommended definition of official use encompasses four factors. The following
characteristics should automatically make an account “official” for purposes of our proposal: (1)
an explicit disclaimer of an account’s status as an official government account; (2) a description
on the account of the person’s official government office; (3) one or more links to an official
government website; or (4) posting content in furtherance of one’s official duties, including, but
not limited to, publishing press releases, advocating for legislation, or sharing information
about hearings, town halls, or state visits. The fourth prong of this definition is broad but
necessary. For example, without the fourth prong, a public official could evade this law simply
by listing his or her name without a disclaimer, description, or link to government website but
post substantively about his or her role as a public official. A content-based prong is necessary
to close any loopholes and ensure all elected and appointed public officials as defined above
are regulated.
Official Use Examples
Explicit Disclaimer
Description of Office
Government Link

“Official Senate Account”
“Official Account of the Secretary of State”
“45th President of the United States of America, Washington D.C.”
“U.S. Senator, Massachusetts”
Any website ending in “.gov”
“https://ocasio-cortez.house.gov”

“Any User” Defined
The proposed legislative framework specifically prohibits blocking or deleting comments from
“any user,” not just a public official’s constituents or U.S. citizens. It would be impractical to
limit the legislation’s protections to public officials’ constituents because enforcing the law
would require verifying that a user was a given official’s constituent. Additionally, social media
has a global reach and constituents are not the only people invested in what public officials
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post. This is especially true for federal officials whose votes and actions have a national and, in
some cases, global impact.92
There is no need to distinguish between citizen social media users and non-citizen social media
users because the First Amendment may apply to non-citizens as well as citizens. The Supreme
Court has extended some, but not all, constitutional protections to non-citizens.93 For example,
the Supreme Court has ruled that in the context of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, an
undocumented immigrant is “surely a ‘person.’”94

Exceptions to the Proposed Framework
Our proposal would not prevent a public official from deleting comments from social media
users that include speech that is not protected by the First Amendment. Additionally, public
officials have options for managing content that stop short of blocking users or deleting their
posts.
1. Language Not Traditionally Protected by the First Amendment
Language not traditionally protected by the First Amendment need not be tolerated by public
officials on their accounts. The following nine categories of speech are traditionally viewed by
courts as unprotected by the First Amendment: obscenity, fighting words, true threats,
incitement to imminent lawless action, defamation (including libel and slander), child
pornography, perjury, blackmail, and solicitations to commit crimes.95
Although it appears that unprotected speech can be organized into one neat list, applying these
exceptions would likely be challenging in some cases. What constitutes obscenity has been
famously defined by the Supreme Court’s “know it when I see it” test.96 Fighting words and true
threats are also arguable based on subjective interpretations of the words in a particular

92

Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez settled a lawsuit for blocking a former New York lawmaker who is not
one of her constituents. See Letter from Jameel Jaffer, Exec. Dir., Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ.,
to Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Member, U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 28, 2019).
93
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273
(1990).
94
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).
95
Which Types of Speech Are Not Protected by the First Amendment?, FREEDOM FORUM INST.,
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/about/faq/which-types-of-speech-are-not-protected-by-the-firstamendment/ (last visited June 15, 2020).
96
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has since refined this
test in cases like Miller v. California, where the Court held the three-part test for obscenity is: “(a) whether ‘the
average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.” 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (internal citations omitted).
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context, despite definitions provided by the Supreme Court. Public officials should make use of
these exceptions in good faith and should not attempt to seize on ambiguities in the law to
censor protected speech.
Examples of Exceptions: Language Not Protected by the First Amendment
Fighting words

“‘[F]ighting words’ [are] those personally abusive epithets
which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter
of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent
reaction.”97

True threats

“‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or
group of individuals.”98
“Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the
word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat
to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the
victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”99

Incitement to Imminent
Lawless Action

Imminent lawless action must: (1) be directed toward a specific
group or person; (2) be a direct call to commit immediate
lawless action; and (3) be an expectation that the speech will
lead to lawless action.100

2. Caveat: Muting and Hiding Functions on Social Media Platforms
Our proposed legislation prohibits public officials from blocking users or deleting comments
unless they fall into the above exceptions. However, there is one caveat to this rule that the
trial court in Knight Institute considered. Twitter and Facebook both have an option to “mute” a
user instead of blocking the user, and Facebook allows users to “hide” comments posted to
users’ pages. When a user is blocked, he or she cannot see the blocker’s tweets nor interact
with the blocker’s account in any way.101 However, when a user is muted, that user’s tweets are
simply eliminated from the muting user’s timeline.102 To analogize to the pre-social media era,

97

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (holding that the display of the words, “Fuck the Draft” was not
fighting words); see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
98
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (holding that
political hyperbole is not a true threat).
99
Virginia, 538 U.S. at 360.
100
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973); see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (providing
the famous example of shouting fire in a crowded theatre as this type of unprotected speech).
101
Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 551-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
102
How to Mute Accounts on Twitter, TWITTER: HELP CENTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/

21

Democracy Clinic

blocking a user is akin to prohibiting people from sending letters to public officials, while
muting is akin to allowing letters to be sent, but not mandating that public officials open or
read the letters.
In Knight Institute, the District Court for the Southern District of New York acknowledged that
muting on Twitter would be constitutional under the First Amendment.103 We agree with this
view and believe that hiding comments on Facebook falls into the same category. Constituents
must be able to voice their opinions, but there should not be a legal requirement that public
officials listen or respond to them.104

Monitoring and Enforcement
Our proposal should be enforced by entities inside the legislative and executive branches. The
penalty for an official who does not follow the regulations should be the release of a public
report alerting the public to the official’s non-compliance.
1. Enforcement for the Legislative Branch
The procedures for enforcing congressional ethics rules could be used to monitor lawmakers’
compliance with the proposed legislation. The House of Representatives Office of Congressional
Ethics (“OCE”) “has jurisdiction to investigate any alleged violation of a ‘law, rule, regulation, or
other standard of conduct’ committed by a ‘Member, officer, or employee of the House.’”105
Information about potential violations can come from a variety of sources, including the
public.106 After an investigation, the OCE decides what to recommend to the Committee on
Ethics.107 The Committee on Ethics then decides whether to dismiss the investigation, conduct
further investigation, or impose sanctions.108 Unless the OCE recommends dismissal of the
investigation, the OCE’s report and findings must be released to the public.109
The Senate Select Committee on Ethics “is authorized to receive and investigate allegations of .
. . violations of law . . . and report violations of law to the proper federal and state
authorities.”110 Similar to the OCE, the Senate Committee receives information from “virtually

twitter-mute (last visited June 15, 2020).
103
302 F. Supp. 3d at 577.
104
See Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979) (stating “the First Amendment does
not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to listen [or] to respond”).
105
Learn, OFFICE OF CONG. ETHICS, https://oce.house.gov/learn (last visited June 15, 2020) (quoting H.R. Res. 895,
110th Cong. § 1(9)(C)(1)(A) (2008) (enacted)).
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Jurisdiction, U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, https://www.ethics.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/jurisdiction
(last visited June 15, 2020).
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any source,” including the public.111 If the Committee finds the information about the violation
of law to be credible, the Committee can issue a public or private admonition, recommend
further disciplinary action, or initiate an adjudicatory review.112
Because we are proposing a federal law, members of the public who have been blocked or had
their comments deleted by a member of Congress can report the violation directly to the OCE
or Senate Select Committee on Ethics. The OCE is mandated to act much faster than the
courts.113 Although the Senate Select Committee on Ethics does not provide a specific timeline
for each investigation, the Committee states that its investigations are faster if not many
interviews are required and there is not a parallel criminal inquiry.114 Here, there would be no
need for any interviews or criminal inquiry because evidence of blocking or deleting comments
could be obtained immediately through the user’s social media account. This approach to
enforcement eliminates the delay of lengthy and expensive court battles because members of
the public would not have to hire lawyers to file a lawsuit to be unblocked by a public official.
2. Enforcement for the Executive Branch
Enforcement for executive branch public officials should be conducted by two separate entities.
First, public officials appointed by the president to positions in federal agencies should be
monitored by their agencies’ inspectors general. Second, public officials elected to their
positions in the executive branch, namely the president and vice president, should be
monitored by Congress via the House Oversight Committee or the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.115
The offices of inspectors general were established by the Inspector General Act of 1978.116
Inspectors general are placed within each agency to monitor its operations and investigate
cases of fraud, waste, misconduct, and other abuses within each agency.117 Inspectors general

111

Frequently Asked Questions: Investigations, U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS,
https://www.ethics.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/frequently-asked-questions1 (last visited June 15, 2020).
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can conduct investigations either independently or in response to reports of misconduct from
the public.118 There are currently 73 offices of inspectors general.119
The president and vice president are not subject to the jurisdiction of the inspectors general,
nor are they subject to many other ethics rules applicable to most federal employees.120
However, Congress has two committees that have the ability to monitor presidential and vice
presidential actions: the House Oversight Committee and the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Government Affairs. The House Oversight Committee has broad jurisdiction to
oversee “any matter” within the jurisdiction of other standing House committees.121 The
current House Oversight chairman has used the committee’s authority to launch inquiries into
the use of President Trump’s Washington, D.C., hotel and the president’s handling of classified
information.122 The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs also
has broad jurisdiction in “studying and investigating the compliance or noncompliance with
rules, regulations and laws, . . . which have an impact upon or affect the national health,
welfare and safety.”123
3. Specific Enforcement Methods
As a penalty for blocking users or deleting comments in violation of the proposed law, we
recommend the release of investigative reports to the public. The political pressure associated
with the release of reports would likely result in the unblocking or restoring of user comments.
Civil penalty schemes might not be as effective. They could allow public officials to pay their
fines but continue to block users or delete user comments. There is evidence that the
effectiveness of a civil penalty depends on the severity of that penalty,124 and we are hesitant
to recommend high-cost fines for a civil infraction. Public discontent will more likely result in
the intended reaction from public officials than would the mandate to pay a civil fine.
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IV. Conclusion
Public officials use social media platforms as their primary mode of communication with the
public. Yet, the First Amendment rights of social media users have not been adequately
protected through existing congressional and agency-imposed social media policies. Judicial
review of user claims against public officials who have blocked their accounts or deleted their
comments on social media platforms is inconsistent, time-consuming, and costly. Legislation is
needed so that all social media users’ First Amendment rights are protected consistently and
efficiently. Our proposed legislation prohibits “public officials” using social media for “official
use” from blocking any users or deleting any user comments. The legislation allows for
exceptions where the user is posting content that is not protected by the First Amendment,
such as true threats or fighting words. Although this report focuses on federal legislation, state
legislatures should apply this framework to their governments as well. Without this statutory
protection, social media users’ First Amendment rights will only be selectively enforced based
on their ability to file a lawsuit and the case law of the jurisdiction where a suit is filed.
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